Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education: Roadblocks to the Implementation of Brown by Montgomery, J. W., III
William & Mary Law Review
Volume 12 | Issue 4 Article 7
Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of
Education: Roadblocks to the Implementation of
Brown
J. W. Montgomery III
Copyright c 1971 by the authors. This article is brought to you by the William & Mary Law School Scholarship Repository.
http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/wmlr
Repository Citation
J. W. Montgomery III, Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education: Roadblocks to the
Implementation of Brown, 12 Wm. & Mary L. Rev. 838 (1971), http://scholarship.law.wm.edu/
wmlr/vol12/iss4/7
NOTES
SWANN v. CHARLOTTE-MECKLENBURG BOARD
OF EDUCATION:
ROADBLOCKS TO THE IMPLEMENTATION OF BROWN
A sextet of cases currently before the Supreme Court of the United
States presents for decision the question, "Does the Constitution require
racial balance in the public schools?" The answer to this question may
place the Ckarlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education' case in a posi-
tion of social and historical importance equal to that of its harbinger,
Brown v. Board of Education.2
Brown found forced segregation in public education to be a denial
of the fourteenth amendment right to equal protection of the laws,3
and therefore struck down the "separate but equal" doctrine of Plessy
v. Ferguson.4 In a companion case, the Supreme Court eliminated the
application of "separate but equal" in the District of Columbia public
school system as a violation of the due process clause of the fifth amend-
ment.' The Court emphasized in Brown that it is the affirmative duty
of the states to end forced segregation as a matter of official policy, but
failed to comment on whether the fourteenth amendment additionally
commands integration. Therefore, imbalance caused by racially moti-
1. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir.), cert.
granted, 399 U.S. 926 (1970). The argument was heard by the Supreme Court October
11-12, 1970.
[As this Note went to press, the Supreme Court announced its decision in the case.
Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 39 USJL.W. 4437 (US. April
20, 1971). Chief Justice Burger's opinion for the Court did not resolve all of the
issues raised by the case and discussed herein. Swann, at best, has heightened the con-
fusion as to the applicability of constitutional requirements in the area of school de-
segregation nationwide. See note 99, infra.]
2. Brown v. Board of Education I, 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Brown v. Board of Education
11, 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
3. U.S. CoNsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
4. 163 U.S. 537 (1895). This case involved transportation facilities. The Court held
the doctrine of "separate but equar' not to be a violation of the "due process" clause
of the fourteenth amendment.
5. Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954).
6. Note, Brown and Bussing, 44 J. URBAN L. 635 (1967). This question remains un-
answered by the Supreme Court, although at least two circuits feel that the Constitution
requires integration. See United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372
F.2d 836 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1966); Evans v. Ennis, 281 F.2d 385
(3rd Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 933 (1960).
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vated public policy is clearly impermissible, while there has been no
concomitant duty to alleviate fortuitous racial discrimination.7 The
distinction between segregation which must be eliminated and segrega-
tion which will be tolerated is traditionally made by an examination of
its origins. De facto segregation resulting from good faith school zoning
is permissible, but de jure segregation, resulting from past or present
public policy, is impermissible.
When the courts find impermissible racial imbalance to exist, there
is a panoply of available remedies including: gerrymandering of school
zones, freedom of choice,8 pairing, grouping and school consolidation,
and transportation of pupils. It is this last remedy, the transportation
of pupils, popularly known as cross-busing, which has caused the great-
est piablic debate and is the central issue in the Charlotte-Mecklenburg
case. In discussing the availability of busing as a remedy for segrega-
tion, this note will be concerned only with the legal issues presented by
the question and will leave for the courts the determination of the
priorities to be given the sociological factors involved.
THE CONGRESSIONAL INTERPRETATION
Brouwn, and the desegregation cases which followed, were based upon
the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, which pro-
vides in pertinent part ".... nor shall any State deprive any person of
life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to" any
person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 9
Congress is given the power of implementing the fourteenth amend-
ment by virtue of section 5 thereof which provides, ". . . the Congress
shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the provisions
of this article." 1o In the exercise of its section 5 powers, Congress en-
acted the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Section 401 (b) of that Act purports
to define desegregation. "As used in this title ... (b) 'Desegregation'
means the assignment of students to public schools and within such
schools without regard to their race, color, religion, or national origin,
7. King, Racial Imbalance in the Public Schools, 18 VAND. L. REv. 1290, 1337 (1065).
See also Deal v. Cincinnati Bbard- of Education I, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966); 'Deal
v. Cincinnati Board -of Education II, 419 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1969); Bell v. School City of
Gary Indiana, 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir, 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1964); Webb v.
Board of Education, 233 F. Supp. 466 (N.D. IM. 1963).
,8. Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970).
9. U.S. Co Nsr. amend. XIV, § 1.
10. Id.§ 5.
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but 'desegregation' shall not mean the assignment of students to public
schools in order to overcome racial imbalance." " Section 407 (a) fur'-
ther provides:
Whenever the Attorney General receives a complaint in writing
... to the effect that... minor children, as members of a class of
persons similarly situated, are being deprived by a school board
of the equal protection of the laws .. .the Attorney General is
authorized... to institute for or in the name of the United States
a civil action ... for such relief as may be appropriate .. .pro-
vided that nothing herein shall empower any official or court of
the United States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial
balance in any school by requiring the transportation of pupils or
students from one school to another or one school district to an-
other in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise enlarge
the existing power of the court to insure compliance with con-
stitutional standards.'12
The interpretation to be given the language in these two sections is
crucial to the busing issue.18 It appears from a literal reading of them
that Congress intended to preclude the possibility of massive cross-busing
as a means of achieving desegregation. This position has been rejected
in at least two circuits' 4 as well as by the United States Department of
Justice. In the amicus curiae memorandum filed by the United States
in McDaniel v. Barresi,' the Government asserted the position that " ...
Sections 401 (b) and 407 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... [apply]
only to federal courts and officials, [and] do not purport to be prohibi-
tions but are simply disclaimers of granting new power to federal
authorities to deal with purely adventitious, de facto segregation." 11
Listed as authority for this proposition were the Fourth Circuit Court
of Appeals decision in S'wann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Edu-
11. 42 U.S.C. § 2000c(b) (1964).
12. Id. § 2000c-6 (a).
13. The language was repeated in 20 U.S.C. § 884 (1964).
14. Swan v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970);
United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 878 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1966).
15. Brief for the Justice Department as Amicus Curiae at 6, in 39 U.S.L.W. 3144
(Oct. 13, 1970).
16. Id.
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cation,17 and the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decision in United States
v. Jefferson County Board of Education.8
The Fourth Circuit rejected the argument that sections 401 (b) and
407 (a) forbid busing on the grounds that ". . . this argument misreads
the legislative history of the statute. Those provisions are not limita-
tions on the power of... courts to remedy unconstitutional segrega-
tion. They were designed to remove any implication that the Civil
Rights Act conferred new jurisdiction on courts to deal with the ques-
tion of whether school boards were obligated to overcome de facto
segregation." 19 But, in place of an analysis of the legislative history
of the Act which purportedly supports this position, the Fourth Circuit
of Appeals relied on the Fifth Circuit's analysis in Jefferson.'0 Thus, the
origin of this interpretation can be traced to that circuit. The court in
Jefferson, after reproducing the definition of desegregation found in
section 401(b), explained that the affirmative portion of the definition
"down to the 'but' clause" describes the assignment provision necessary
in a plan for conversion of a de jure dual system to a unitary, integrated
system. "The negative portion, starting with 'but', excludes assignment
to overcome racial imbalance, that is, acts to overcome de facto
segregation." 21
The court justified this division and reconstruction of the language
of section 401(b) on the grounds that an in-depth examination of the
congressional hearings and debates disclosed that Congress equated the
term "racial imbalance" with de facto segregation.m If this interpreta-
tion is correct, the courts are justified in decreeing mass-busing to end
de jure segregation. If, however, Congress did not intend to exclude
de jure segregation from the protection of section 401(b), the effect
would be to foreclose the use of mass-busing altogether.
The Government Position is Unjustified-Congress Intended No
De Facto-De lure Distinction
The Jefferson decision involved an extensive search of the legislative
background of the 1964 Civil Rights Act; however, several controlling
17. 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970).
18. 372 F.2d 836, 878 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1966).
19. Swarm v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 431 F.2d 138, 146 (4th
Cir. 1970).
20. Id.
21. 372 F.2d 836, 878 (5th Cir. 1966).
22. Id.
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sections of dialogue were omitted and therefore the court's conclusion
as to the meaning of section 401(b) appears erroneous. In order .to
properly understand the meaning of section 401 (b) a complete examina-
tion of the legislative background is in order.
The measure that became the Civil Rights Act of 1964 was rec-
ommended to Congress by President Kennedy. He requested Congress
to " . . . assert its specific constitutional authority to implement the
14th amendment" 23 with respect to achieving desegregation in the
public schools, first by accelerating the litigation process, and second
by a program of technical and financial assistance to school districts
"engaged in the process of meeting the educational problems flowing
from desegregation or racial imbalance. ,, 24
The first round of bills in the House and Senate introduced in response
to the presidential request contained identical provisions. 5 Title II of
each, entitled "Desegregation of Public Education," contained five sec-
tions involved with the correction of racial imbalance.26 The Senate
version floundered almost immediately, while the House bill was com-
pletely rewritten in committee. Finally, an entirely new measure was
reported out of committee 7 in which Title II was renumbered Title IV
and in which every mention of "racial imbalance" was deleted. The
justification for this deletion was that "[t] he committee failed to extend
this assistance to problems frequently referred to as 'racial imbalance'
as no adequate definition of this concept was put forward." 2 Thus, at
this point the committee was certainly not intending racial imbalance
to mean de facto segregation.
On November 20, 1963 the Senate Judiciary Committee reported out
section 401 (b) which provided, " 'Desegregation' means the assignment
of students to public schools without regard to their race, color, religion,
or national origin." 2 On February 6, 1964, an amendment to the bill
was proposed on the ground that the bill as rewritten by the Judiciary
Committee had failed to eliminate racial balancing from its proposals for
desegregation. 0 The amendment, which provided that "'desegrega-
tion' shall not mean the assignment of students to public schools in order
23. 109 CONG. REc. 11174,11176 (1963).
24. Id.
25. S. 1731, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963); H.R. 7152, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. (1963).
26. Id.
27. 109 CONG. REc. 23027 (1963).
28. H.R. REP. No. 914 (Part II), 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 21-22 (1963).
29. Id. at 5.
30. 110 CONG. REC. 1598 (1964).
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to overcome racial imbalance... ," was accepted and section 401 (b) was
adopted by the House. 1
The Senate leadership rewrote the House bill and added a new proviso
to section 407 (a) ,32 similar to the addition to section 401(b). It has
been argued that this new proviso was drafted to allay the fears of
numerous opponents of the measure as a whole who had earlier sug-
gested that, as it passed the House, it would permit the transportation
of school children back and forth to achieve racial balance 3a
Senator Russell of Georgia adopted a contrary position and moved
to strike the newly added parts of sections 401 (b) and 407 (a) which
provided that desegregation was not to mean overcoming racial imbal-
ance. He argued that the deletion would eliminate the sectional aspects
of the bill and would give the Attorney General authority to integrate
outside the South. He asserted that the questioned proviso, if included,
would render the courts powerless to deal with de facto segregation in
the North. 4 Two days later, Senator Humphrey attempted to explain
Tide IV so as to assuage Senator Russell's doubt and to "soothe fears
that Title IV might be read to empower the Federal Government to
order the busing of children around a city in order to achieve a certain
racial balance or mix in schools." 3
31. Id. at 2280, 2285.
32. 110 CoNG. REc. 11926 (1964):
[P~rovided that nothing herein shall empower any official or court of the
United States to issue any order seeking to achieve a racial balance in any
school by requiring the transportation of pupils or students from one
school to another in order to achieve such racial balance, or otherwise en-
large the existing power of the court to insure compliance with constitu-
tional standards.
33. Petitioner's Brief for Certiorari at A24-A25, Bay County v. Youngblood, 430
F.2d 625 (5th Cir.), appeal docketed No. 784, in 39 U.SJL.W. (U.S. Oct. 13, 1970).
34. 110 CONG. RIc. 12436-41 (1964).
35. Id. at 12714:
Next, changes are made to resolve doubts that have been expressed about
the impact of the bill on the problem of correcting alleged racial imbalance
in public schools. The version enacted by the House was not intended to
permit the Attorney General to bring suits to correct such a situation, and,
indeed, said as much in section 401(b). However, to make this doubly
clear, two amendments dealing with this matter are proposed.
The first provides that nothing in title IV "shall empower any court" or
official of the United States to issue "any order" seeking to achieve "a racial
balance in any school by requiring the transp6rtation of pupils or students
from one school to another or one school district to another in order to,
achieve such racial balance or otherwise enlarge the existing power of the
court to insure compliance with constitutional standards." This addition
seeks simply to preclude an inference that the title confers new authority
1971]
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Shortly thereafter, Senator Byrd of West Virginia undertook to ques-
tion Senator Humphrey further concerning Title IV. It is this section
of the Congressional Record upon which the Jefferson court relied most
heavily in justifying its interpretation of Title IV; but portions of this
section which were omitted by the Jefferson court render its conclusion
suspect. The Record discloses the following colloquy:
Mr. Byrd of West Virginia: Can the Senator from Minnesota
assure the Senator from West Virginia that under Title VI [sic]
school children may not be bused from one end of the community
to another end of the community at the taxpayers' expense to re-
lieve so-called racial imbalance in the schools?
Mr. Humphrey: I do. I should like to make one further reference
to the Gary case....36
At this point the Jefferson court quotes Mr. Humphrey as saying, ...
[I]t was decided to write the court's opinion into the proposed sub-
stitute." 37 The court then undertook a discussion of the holding in the
Gary case to which Mr. Humphrey had referred. "The thrust of the
Gary case was that if school districts were drawn without regard to
race ... those districts are valid even if there is racial imbalance caused
by discriminatory practices in housing." 38 Jefferson then rejoins the
Byrd-Humphrey colloquy with Mr. Humphrey saying,
The bill does not attempt to integrate the schools, but it does at-
tempt to eliminate segregation in the schools. The natural factors,
to deal with "racial imbalance" in schools, and should serve to soothe fears
that title IV might be read to empower the Federal Government to order
the bussing of children around a city in order to achieve a certain racial
balance or mix in schools.
Furthermore, a new section 410 would explicitly declare that "nothing in
this tide shall prohibit classification and assignment for reasons other than
race, color, religion, or national origin."
Thus, classification along bona fide neighborhood school lines, or for any
other legitimate reason which local school boards might see fit to adopt,
would not be affected by tide IV, so long as such classification was bona
fide. Furthermore, this amendment makes clear that the only Federal inter-
vention in local schools will be for the purpose of preventing denial of
equal protection of the laws.
Id.
36. 110 CoNG. REc. 12715, 12717 (1964).
37. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 881 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 389 U.S. 840 (1966).
38. Id.
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such as density of population, and the distance that students would
have to travel are considered legitimate means to determine the
validity of a school district, if the school districts are not gerry-
mandered, and in effect deliberately segregated. The fact that
there is a racial imbalance per se is not something which is un-
constitutional. That is why we have attempted to clarify it with
the language of Section 4.39
Thus, the Record appears to support the Jefferson version of sections
401 (b) and 407 (a); however, the court omitted a portion of the dia-
logue which immediately followed Mr. Humphrey's statement, "I should
like to make one further reference to the Gary case," and immediately
preceded the quoted portion beginning with "The bill does not attempt.
." This omitted portion which goes directly to the heart of the
Jefferson argument, reads:
This case makes it quite clear that while the Constitution pro-
hibits segregation, it does not require integration. The busing of
children to achieve racial balance would be an act to effect the
integration of schools. In fact, if the bill were to compel it, it
would be a violation, because it would be handling the matter on
the basis of race and we would be transporting children because
of race.40
It therefore is clear that Congress considered busing to be unconsti-
tutional because it would require a classification based upon race. The
salient points in Mr. Humphrey's analysis were that the Constitution
prohibits segregation but does not require integration, that busing would
effect integration by requiring a classification based on race, and that
therefore busing was prohibited. Congress may or may not have in-
tended to condone de facto segregation, but it clearly considered busing
to achieve a racial balance, whether the imbalance was caused by a
de facto or de jure situation, to be impermissible. Congress simply did
not discuss the relevancy of the origin of the imbalance, and the allu-
sion to Gary was not intended to introduce that issue; rather, Congress
intended to eliminate the use of busing as a weapon against segregation
from whatever source derived. Thus, when courts decree mass-busing
39. Id. See also 110 CoNG. REc. 12717 (1964).
40. 110 CoNG. REC. 12717 (1964). While Senator Humphrey's view that classification
based upon race is impermissible may no longer be- valid, it is clear that he understood
all busing to be impermissible.
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to achieve desegregation, they contravene the solemn declaration of
Congress.
However, the argument that sections 401(b) and 407(a) of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964 apply only to de facto segregation is also
untenable for reasons other than those discussed above.
A DE FActo-DE JuE DISTINCTION IS ILLUSORY
Segregation required by law is commonly referred to as de jure,
while segregation which occurs fortuitously is termed de facto. In Tay-
lor v. Board of Education,4' the court stated that one distinction be-
tween de facto and de jure school segregation was whether "race was
[being] made the basis for school districting with the purpose and effect
of producing a substantially segregated school." I Under this defini-
tion, de jure segregation would be determined only with reference to
actions of the school board, and therefore the definition is apparently
more limited than the Second Circuit intended. The more traditional
definition was given in Moses v.. Washington Parish School,4 3 where the
court said that "... de jure segregation means simply segregation.., that
is forced, purposeful separation of the races." The court defined de facto
segregation as "the mere chance of fortuitous concentration of those of
a particular race in a particular class or school . . . not accomplished in
any way by the action of state officials," but added, "[M] ost situations
of so-called 'de facto segregation' are, in reality, the result of inten-
tional discrimination by state officials." 4
It is this last comment by the court in Moses which is worthy of
further scrutiny. When, if ever, can segregation be found to occur
without some form of state action?
Residential segregation emanating from legislative requirements was
legal until 1917.45 Thus the inherently segregated nature of the older
downtown areas of many of our larger cities can be traced to segrega-
tionist legislation of the past century. Private residential segregation
was held constitutional by the Supreme Court as recently as 1926.46 It
was not until 1948 that private residential segregation was declared ille-
41. 294 F.2d 36 (2d Cit. 1961).
-42. Id. at 39.
43. 276 F. Supp. 834 (E.D. La. 1967).
44. Id. at 840, 847.'
45. Buchanan -r. Warley, 245 U.S. 60 (1917).
46. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U.S. 323 (1926).
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gal in Shelley v. Kramer.17 History has shown that once housing pat-
terns are established they are more or less permanent, and therefore,
many pockets of segregation can be said to be products of private
segregational practices prior to 1948. It is significant to note that the
companion case to Shelley arose in Michigan.48 Therefore these segre-
gationist policies existed in both the North and the South.
On July 7, 1970, Ramsey Clark, former Attorney General of the
United States, testifying before the Senate Select Committee on Equal
Educational Opportunities, said: "In fact, there is no de facto segregation.
All segregation reflects some past action of our governments."4' This
conclusion appears justified if one considers that practically every state
outside the South at some point in history had either (1) mandatory
segregation of public schools, (2) permissive segregation, (3) anti-negro
voting laws, (4) miscegenation statutes, or (5) local practices reflecting
racial distinctions as revealed by judicial decisions or statutes, regardless
of state laws.50 Whether such state action required or merely permitted
school segregation should be irrelevant if the result was segregation of
the races. Even where the statutes were repealed prior to 1954, the
pattern of segregation may have been so well established that its con-
tinued existence could only be classified as de jure.5'
Anti-black voting laws removed a large block of votes which poten-
tially could have been mustered to push for desegregation statutes such
as open housing and mandatory school integration. While miscegena-
tion laws had no direct effect on school segregation, they evinced a
state policy of "white supremacy." Viewed in this manner, it is diffi-
cult to conceive of any segregation which can be classified as purely
de facto. Therefore, when the courts and the Justice Department make
a distinction between the "types" of segregation and apply a congres-
sional mandate to one type, but not to the other, they do so, it would
appear, on untenable and fallacious grounds. The application of section
401 (b) and section 407 (a) should not rest on such unsound hypotheses.
47. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
48. McGhee v. Spies, No. 87, Oct. Term 1947, companion case to Shelley v. Kramer.
49. Brief for the Commonwealth of Virginia as Amicus Curiae at 9, Swann v.
Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 431 F.2d 138 (4th Cir. 1970). See also
Spangler v. Pasadena, 311 F. Supp. 501, 522 (CD. Cal. 1970).
50. Beckett v. School Board, 308 F. Supp. 1274, 1304 (ED. Va. 1969).
51. Id. at 1311-15. See also Freund, Ciil Rights and the Limits of Law, 14 BUriALo
L. REv. 199, 205 (1964).
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THE UNEQUAL ADHERENCE TO THE CONSTITUTIONAL DuTY
As stated above, Brown P held state-enforced segregation in the
public schools to be a denial of equal protection of the law. The ra-
tionale behind this decision involved the realization that ".. . segregation
of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect
upon the colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanc-
tion of law. .. ." Thus the reasoning behind the Brown decision
applies to all segregation, whether classified as de facto or de jure. In
simple terms, this position is that Brown holds all segregated education
to be unequal, and since education is provided and maintained by the
state, its maintenance is a violation of the fourteenth amendment. 4
Brown made no de jure-de facto distinction.
A survey of the circuits discloses that this reasoning has not been
accepted by the lower federal courts. On remand, the District Court
of Kansas expressly interpreted the Supreme Court opinion in Brown as
holding, "Desegregation does not mean that there must be intermingling
of the races in all school districts. It means only that they may not be
prevented from intermingling or going to school together because of
race or color." 5' The most recent decision in this circuit is Downs v.
Board of Education of Kansas City5 Therein, the court found that
the fourteenth amendment prohibits segregation but does not require
integration, and that there is no constitutional duty to change inno-
cendy determined school attendance districts even though such districts
result in racial imbalance. 7 Thus the Tenth Circuit will not interfere
with innocent (de facto) segregation, while purposeful (de jure) seg-
regation will be eliminated. This is true even though, per Brown, the
effects of both are harmful to the children.
Perhaps the most controversial statement on the subject was made
by a federal district court in Briggs v. Elliott,5  where it was said that
"the constitution . . . does not require integration. It merely forbids
discrimination." " This position has been specifically repudiated in the
52. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
53. Id. at 494.
54. Hyman & Newhouse, Desegregation of the Schools: The Present Legal Situation,
14 BUrALo L. REv. 208, 223 (1964). Therein the possibility of this argument was
recognized.
55. 139 F. Supp. 468,470 (D. Kan. 1955).
56. 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964), cert. denied, 380 U.S. 914 (1965).
57. Id. at 998.
58. 132 F. Supp. 776, 778 (E.D. S.C. 1955).
59. Id. at 777.
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Fourth ° and Fifth Circuits,6 1 the two circuits encompassing the so-
called "Deep South" states. Thus the incongruity in application of the
constitutional principles enunciated in Brown begins to emerge. The
Tenth Circuit, the place of origin of Brounm I and II, reads those deci-
sions as merely prohibiting purposeful segregation not "innocently
arrived at," de facto segregation. The antithesis of this position is found
in the decisions of the two southern circuits wherein the greatest racial
discrimination in public education was practiced prior to 1954. The
Fifth Circuit goes so far as to find that the Constitution requires inte-
gration.2 This may also be the position of the Third Circuit as pre-
sented in Evans v. Ennis,u where the court speaks of a duty to integrate.
But the majority view apparently adhered to by six and perhaps seven
of the circuits, is that segregated school attendance districts, if inno-
cently arrived at, are constitutionally permissible.
The principal case espousing this position is Bell v. School City of
Gary, Indiana4 which arose in the Seventh Circuit. There the school
district was 95.7 per cent white and 4.3 per cent black. To achieve
racial balance would have required the busing of 6000 students daily.
In specifically approving Briggs v. Elliott, the Bell court found "... no
affirmative U. S. Constitutional duty to change innocently arrived
at school attendance districts [even if] the resulting effect is to have a
racial imbalance in certain schools." 61 The primary emphasis appears
to have been placed on the good faith of the school board. It should
be noted that this is the case which Mr. Humphrey referred to in dis-
cussing Title IV of the Civil Rights Act of 1964.
The Sixth Circuit decisions in Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education
I and 1166 appear to adopt an even more relaxed test than Bell for deter-
mining what conduct by the school board will be acceptable. In Deal I,
the court found no duty on the part of the school board to end racial
imbalance which it did not cause ". . . nor is there a like duty to select
60. Walker v. County School Board, 413 F.2d 53, 54 (4th Cit. 1969).
61. United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372 F.2d 836, 862 (5th
Cir. 1966); Singleton v. Jackson Municipal Separate School District, 348 F.2d 729, 730
(5th Cir. 1965).
62. 372 F.2d at 845-46. "The U. S. Constitution, as construed in Brown, requires
public school systems to integrate"
63. 281 F.2d 385 (3rd Cir. 1960).
64. 324 F.2d 209 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 924 (1963).
65. Id. at 213.
66. Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education I, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir. 1966); Deal v.
Cincinnati Board of Education II, 419 F.2d 1387 (6th Cir. 1969).
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new school sites solely in furtherance of such a purpose." 67 Thus it
appears that the Deal I court would find a school board's actions to be
in "good faith" even when the board adopts a plan of selecting new
school sites in such a manner as to continue segregation. Such activity,
however, would probably not meet the Bell standard of "good faith."
Deal 116 reiterated this position by finding no abuse of discretion on
the part of the school board in the location of schools and announced
an intention not to tell the school board where to locate its new schools
in the future.69
The posture of the Second Circuit is less clear, but it appears to favor
the Bell view. In Offerman v. Nitkwoski,7° the court referred to both
Bell and Deal in saying that courts generally agree that school boards
have no constitutional duty to eliminate bona fide de facto segregation.
But the court held that it would be constitutionally permissible to exor-
cise de facto segregation if a community so desired.71 However, there
is one Second Circuit decision, Blocker v. Board of Education,72 which
at least one commentator has interpreted as requiring an affirmative duty
to integrate.73 Other commentators feel that the court did not determine
that racial imbalance alone was unconstitutional, 74 and this appears to
be the better view. What the case does appear to hold is that strict
adherence to a neighborhood school policy during a period of change
in population patterns which results in an almost totally segregated
school system is improper. The case therefore stands as a warning to
school boards of de facto segregated districts within the second circuit
that inaction in the face of such segregation is educationally harmful and
therefore unconstitutional.75
In Barksdale v. Springfield School Committee7 6 the United States
District Court for Massachusetts stated that it could not accept the posi-
tion in Bell that only forced segregation was unconstitutional, nor could
67. 369 F.2d at 60.
68. 419 F.2d at 1387.
69. Id. at 1393.
70. 378 F.2d 22 (2nd Cir. 1967).
71. Id. at 24.
72. 229 F. Supp. 709 (ED.N.Y. 1964).
73. Note, supra note 6, at 641.
74. Hyman & Newhouse, supra note 54. See also A. BicErL, THE Suv REM COURT
AND THE IDEA OF PROGRESS 131, 133 (1970).
75. Hyman & Newhouse, supra note 54, at 226.
76. 237 F. Supp. 543 (D. Mass. 1965).
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it accept the idea that the Constitution does not require integration.1T
However, this holding was reversed by the court of appeals."8 Thus,
the First Circuit appears to adopt a position similar to that of the
Seventh.
The Eighth Circuit decision handed down by Judge Blackmun in
Kemp v. Beasley 11179 appears to agree that the achievement of "deseg-
regation" does not necessitate a racial balance in every school in the
systemY0
Thus, from the above survey of nine circuits, it is apparent that there
is little uniformity of opinion among them as to the mandate of Brown.
The Fifth and, perhaps, the Third Circuits openly require integration.
The Fourth Circuit in Charlotte-Mecklenburg has required mass-busing
to alleviate de jure segregation. The Sixth and Seventh Circuits differ
as to what action will be required of a school board faced with a de facto
segregation situation, and the remaining circuits appear to adopt a posi-
tion similar to one or the other of the latter two.
The decision which probably best illustrates the confused state of the
courts is that of Downs v. Board of Education.8 ' There the court was
dealing with a situation which clearly involved traditional de jure seg-
regation. Until 1951, a Kansas statute required separation of the races
in public education. After Brown II, in 1955, the school board had
moved quickly to desegregate the schools with the result that only a
few remained racially un-balanced. After discussing the Bell decision,
the court announced,
We conclude that the decisions in Brown. .. do not require a
school board to destroy or abandon a school system developed on
the neighborhood school plan, even though it results in a racial
imbalance... where, as here, that school system has been honestly
and conscientiously constructed with no intention or purpose to
maintain or perpetuate segregation. 2
Thus in an historically de jure segregation jurisdiction, the courts applied
the traditional justification for allowing a de facto situation to stand.
77. Id. at 546. See also United States v. Jefferson County Board of Education, 372
F.2d 836,874 (5th Cir. 1966).
78. Springfield School Committee v. Barksdale, 348 F.2d 261 (1st Cir. 1965).
79. 423 F.2d 851 (8th Cir. 1970).
-80. Id. at 857.
81. 336 F.2d 988 (10th Cir. 1964).
82. Id. at 998.
1971]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW
The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit has, therefore, come full
cycle, and has arrived at a conclusion which is not consistent with the
historical fact situation presented to it. This is not to say, however, that
the conclusion is unjustified, for the situation there presented did re-
semble de facto segregation. Rather, it illustrates the fact that the Tenth
Circuit has abandoned the traditional distinction between de jure and
de facto segregation and is now willing to classify a "segregated" situ-
ation on the basis of the immediate cause, in this case good faith school
zoning, rather than on the basis of past statutory history.
In the Charlotte-Mecklenburg case, the court said that "constitutional
principles dealing with [segregation] should be applied nationally." 1
This is not the case, however, as the survey of nine circuits indicates.
The circuits divide along two principal lines-those faced primarily with
de jure segregation have reacted most strongly, requiring mass-busing
or, as in the Fifth Circuit, reading Brown as commanding integration.
The other circuits are faced primarily by segregation which they clas-
sify as de facto and differ only as to the remedial measures they will
require the school boards to effect in dealing with the segregation. For
the most part, however, such segregation is allowed to continue.
Congress attempted to define "desegregation" but its definition has
been given a sectional nature by an interpretation which finds its anti-
busing provision to apply only in the case of de facto segregation. This
interpretation eliminates one of the most potent weapons for dealing
with the de facto situation.
It therefore appears that before any attempt can be made to deal with
the problems of segregation, one must first come to grips with the
distinction between de facto and de jure segregation. The problem then
becomes the illusory nature of de facto segregation, for as Mr. Clark
said, " ... [T]here is no de facto segregation. All segregation reflects
some past action by our governments." 84
SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
When the Supreme Court announces its decision in Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg it will not be painting on a clean canvas. In the time period
between Browun H in 1955 and the 1971 Spring Term, the Supreme
Court has rendered at least three decisions dealing with the desegrega-
tion problem which must be considered.
83. Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg County Board of Education, 431 F.2d 138,
142 (4th Cir. 1970).
84. Note 49 supra.
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In Green v. County School Board89 the Court was presented with
a classic de jure segregation fact situation."' New Kent is a rural eastern
Virginia county and in 1968 it has approximately 1300 public school
pupils of which 740 were negro and 550 were white. The county
maintained only two public schools, one of which was all black, the
other all white. The county's buses travelled over-lapping routes carry-
ing the students to their respective schools. Five months after suit was
instituted in 1965, the county adopted a "freedom-of-choice" plan which
resulted in no white transfers and only 15 per cent negro transfers.
The Court noted that "Brown II was a call for the dismantling of
well entrenched dual systems... ." 8,7 In determining whether the school
board had met that command by adopting a "freedom-of-choice" plan,
the Court saying that it was relevant to consider that the county's first
step did not come until eleven years after Brown I, and ten years after
Brown II directed the making of a "prompt and reasonable start." This
delay was viewed as a deliberate perpetuation of the unconstitutional
dual system.8 Upon this determination, the Court issued its often quoted
instruction, "The burden on a school board today is to come forward
with a plan that promises realistically to work, and promises realistically
to work now." 89 This language has provided the justification for the
most recent round of attacks on de jure segregation.
Alexander v. Holmes County Board of Education ° echoed this com-
mand by stating that ". . . a standard of allowing 'all deliberate speed'
for desegregation is no longer constitutionally permissible." "' But the
most important language in Alexander is that defining a unitary school
system as one "within which no person is to be effectively excluded...
because of race or color." 92 Carter v. West Feliciana Parish School
Board93 reaffirmed this position by charging every school board with
the duty to terminate dual systems at once and thereafter to operate
only "unitary" school systems.
85. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
86. By constitution and statute Virginia required segregation in the public schools.
VA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 140 (1902); VA. CODE ANN. § 22-221 (1950).
87. 391 U.S. 430,437 (1968).
88. Id. at 438-39.
89. Id. at 439.
90. 396 U.S. 19 (1969).
91. Id. at 20.
92. Id.
93. 396 U.S. 290, 291 (1969).
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In Northeross v. Board of Education,)9 4 the Court of Appeals for the
Sixth Circuit had found that a unitary system existed and therefore held
Alexander to be inapplicable. The Supreme Court reversed, holding
that the appellate court was premature in its judgment on the grounds
that the school board had not complied with all of the district court
directives. On remand, the district court found no constitutional obli-
gation to transport pupils to overcome a racial imbalance,95 thus re-
maining in line with the traditional Sixth Circuit position represented
by the Deal decision. 6 Therefore, it would appear that the "work now"
requirement of Green and the "unitary school" requirement of Alex-
ander are primarily aimed at southern de jure segregation, and will not
be applied to northern and western "de facto" segregation.
CONCLUSION
In its resolution of the Charlotte-Mecklenburg case, the Supreme
Court will have to deal with the three issues discussed above: The
intent of Congress, particularly the Civil Rights Act of 1964, sections
401 (b) and 407 (a); the meaning and validity of the terms de facto and
de jure segregation; and the controlling precedents previously estab-
lished by the Court itself. It appears the final determination will of
necessity be a variation of one of the three following alternatives.
The Court may render a decision very similar' to the opinion of the
appellate court in Charlotte-Mecklenburg. This would require a finding
that sections 401 (b) and 407 (a) of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 were
designed to protect northern de facto segregation but were not intended
to limit the power of the courts to deal with de jure segregation. The
de jure-de facto distinction would necessarily have to be retained in
order to support this interpretation of the Civil Rights Act. Corre-
spondingly, Brown would have to be read as requiring an end only to
state-enforced segregation thus preventing northern "de facto" segre-
gation from falling within its ambit. By adopting these interpretations,
the Court would be free to order massive busing in the South under the
rationale of Green and Alexander. The only plans which could possibly
meet these standards would be those which rely heavily on the massive
busing of students. By the same token, de facto systems would be ex-
94. 397 U.S. 232 (1970).
95. Northcross v. Board of Education, 312 F. Supp. 1150 (W.D. Tenn. 1970).
96. Deal v. Cincinnati Board of Education, 369 F.2d 55 (6th Cir.), cert. denied,
389 U.S. 847 (1967).
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empt from such requirements as they have, by definition, already
achieved "unitary" systems.
There are several conceptual weaknesses inherent in this position.
Congress did not intend to exempt de jure segregation from its ban on
busing. To say that it did, is to misread the record. This, however,
need not be fatal. The Court may invalidate those portions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 which attempt to prohibit busing on the ground
that Congress's power under section five of the fourteenth amendment
is limited to adopting measures to enforce the guarantees of the amend-
ment but grants Congress no power to restrict, abrogate, or dilute
them. 7 To eliminate busing as a weapon is to restrict the guarantees
of the fourteenth amendment.
The most objectionable premise in this alternative is the assertion that
Brown intended to terminate only state-enforced segregation. As seen
before, Brown said, "Segregation of white and colored children in pub-
lic schools has a detrimental effect upon the colored children [and
today] . . . education is perhaps the most important function of state
and local governments." 98 Certainly, this rationale supports an attack
on all segregation, not just segregation falling under the traditional de
jure definition. Therefore, to adopt an approach similar to that taken
by the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Charlotte-Mecklenburg
would only serve to delay a final resolution of the problems presented,
and would appear to be contrary to the logical import of Brown I that
racial balance should be achieved wherever possible in both "de facto"
and "de jure" situations.99
97. See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 642 n.1 (1966).
98. Brown v. Board of Education, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
99. [It appears that the Supreme Court decision in Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg
Board of Education, 39 U.SJL.W. 4437 (U.S. April 20, 1971), has roughly approximated
this alternative. The Supreme Court announced that its "... objective today remains
to eliminate from the public schools all vestiges of state-imposed segregation," thus
adopting by implication a de facto-de jure distinction. The underlying conceptual and
theoretical weakness of this position is apparent in the sentence which followed,
wherein the Court said, "Segregation was the evil struck down by Brown I as con-
trary to the equal protection guarantees of the Constitution." Thus, the Court has
correctly interpreted Brown I as finding all segregation intolerable, but has emasculated
this interpretation by rendering a decision concerned only with "state-imposed segre-
gation." The meaning of "state-imposed segregation" was clear in 1954 because cer-
tain states by statute required separation of the races in public education; the term is
viable today when the courts are confronted by recalcitrant school boards like that
of New Kent County, Virginia, in the Green decision. But for the majority of school
attendance districts, the term "state-imposed segregation" is without the specificity
necessary to bring an effective end to the harm of segregation. Unfortunately, there-
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The opposite position to the one hypothesized above would find the
Supreme Court reading the Brourt decisions in conformity with the
Fifth Circuit view, that is, as requiring integration. Such a position
would certainly by-pass any Court-Congress confrontation over the
meaning of desegregation. Although Congress might interpret desegre-
gation as not including busing, once the Court finds an affirmative duty
to integrate, all concern for desegregation would become obsolete.
The greatest obstacle to this position, aside from any political reper-
cussions, would be that of enforcement. The school systems would
be thrown into a state of confusion much like the present condition
of many state legislatures over the voting rights issue. If integration were
constitutionally required, the problem of the proper racial proportions
would arise, and allowable percentages of deviation would have to be
established. Thus if a particular school attendance district contained
a racial percentage of 70-30 then all schools within that district would'
be required to reflect an approximately similar make-up. The problems
of "white flight" and the general tendency toward racial migration
would keep the racial make-up of any school district in a constant state
of flux, and therefore zones would have to be continually redrawn. The
logical solution to this problem would be to determine the racial make-
up based upon the contiguous economic area, for example the Virginia
cities of Norfolk, Newport News, Hampton, and Virginia Beach, and
to use this ratio as the base rather than the percentage composition
within each individual attendance district. This approach would dis-
courage "white flight." Parents would be forced to realize that if they
intend to live and work in any particular area and send their children
to public schools in that area, then they could not, by relocating their
residence within that area, escape the impact of integration. All schools
in the Norfolk, Newport News, Hampton, Virginia Beach grouping
fore, it appears that under the Swann decision segregation which is capable of cure
will continue.
In justifying their concern with only those "system[s] with a history of segregation,"
the Court said
We do not reach in this case the question whether a showing that school
segregation is a consequence of other types of state action, without any dis-
criminatory action by the school authorities, is a constitutional violation
requiring remedial action by a school desegregation decree. This case does
not present that question and we therefore do not decide it.
In reviewing the judicial history of the civil rights cases, it appears that the Court has
never granted certiorari to a case which did present this question. In view of thc
admitted implication of Browsn I, the end of all segregation, one can only wonder when
the Court will grant certiorari to a case which does squarely present this issue.]
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would have very nearly the same racial composition. This could be
achieved by a plan of transferring students between the cities to facili-
tate the balancing. The major problem with this proposal, however,
is readily apparent. Some states, like Virginia,10° have statutes allowing
consolidation of school districts between counties, but other states do
not. Therefore, where consolidation statutes do not exist such a re-
quirement might infringe on the states' concept of sovereignty. Further-
more, contiguous economic areas are often multi-jurisdictional in com-
position, as in the Washington, D.C. area. A consolidation move here
would pose serious constitutional problems.
The third alternative is more moderate, but it attempts to resolve
the unanswered questions of the first alternative. Browun would be read
as calling for an end to all types of segregation, whether it be of the south-
ern de jure or northern de facto variety. No constitutional duty to
achieve a uniform racial balance would be absolutely required, but the
individual school boards would be required to racially balance to the
maximum practicable extent. Section 401 (b) and 407 (a) of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964 would be invalidated on the same grounds as de-
scribed above-that they impermissibly limit the enforcement of the
fourteenth amendment. Furthermore, the distinction between de jure
and de facto segregation would be abandoned as illusory. In its place, a
test of "good faith" would be adopted as a means of judging a school
board's compliance with the mandate of Broun. This type of approach
was foreshadowed by the concurring opinion of Chief Justice Burger
in Northeross wherein he recognized that there are more than just two
types of situations (de jure-de facto) with which the courts could be
faced.
These school cases present widely varying factors: some records
reveal plans for desegregating schools, others have no plans or only
partial plans; some records reflect rezoning of school districts,
others do not; some use traditional bus transportation such as began
with consolidated schools where such transportation was impera-
tive, others use school bus transportation for a different purpose
and unrelated to the availability of a school as to which such trans-
portation is not required."'-
Therefore the remedies should be decided according to the fact situ-
100. VA. CONST. art. IX, § 132 (1902). VA. CODE ANN. §§ 22-30, -100.1 (Repl. Vol.
1969).-
101. Northcross v. Board of Education, 397 US. 232, 236 (1970).
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ations presented. A "good faih" test was recognized to be workable in
this area by Green. What was said therein will be directly applicable
as a solution in Charlotte-Mecklenburg if the reference to "state im-
posed" is deleted.
There is no universal answer to complex problems of desegrega-
tion. There is obviously no one plan that will do the job in every
case. The matter must be assessed in light of the circumstances
present and the options available in each instance.. .. [W] here the
court finds the board to be acting in good faith and the proposed
plan to have real prospects for dismantling the.., system "at the
earliest practicable date", then the plan may be said to provide
effective relief. Of course, the availability to the board of other
more promising courses of action may indicate a lack of good
faith; and at least it places a heavy burden upon the board to ex-
plain its preference for an apparently less effective method.102
Extensive busing would be prima facie evidence of good faith, but
the final determination of the degree of use of that remedy would re-
main in the hands of the individual school boards. If other effective
means of compliance with Broam were available, the school board could
rule out busing altogether. This approach would require the same test
in all parts of the United States and would result in the uniform appli-
cation of the constitutional duty, while simultaneously meeting the
Alexander requirement of a "unitary" school system. The next step
would then be the adoption of a "good faith" test for evaluating the
movement toward a racial balance in the public schools.
J. W. MONTGOMERY, III
102. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
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